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RULES 
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Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 8 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHIRLEY CARRIER, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba 
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM 
ROGER SMITH, AND PLEASANT 
GROVE CITY, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 940550-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this 
matter in accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the 
Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3) (j ) (1994 
as Amended). The matter was properly poured over to the Utah 
Court of Appeals in accordance with Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-
3(2)(k) (1994 as Amended). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
. . . (b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct 
that one or two jurors in addition to the regular panel 
be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. 
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called 
shall replace jurors, who prior to the time the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualify to perform their duties. Alternate juror 
shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same 
qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, 
and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities, 
and privileges as the principal jurors. An alternate 
juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be 
discharged after the jury retires to consider its 
verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called 
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in 
addition to those otherwise allowed. The additional 
peremptory challenge may be used only against an 
alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges 
allowed by law shall not be used against the 
alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge 
is an objection made to the trial jurors and may be 
directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual 
juror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but 
where there are several parties on either side, they 
must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) challenge to panel; time and manner of 
taking; proceedings. A challenge to the panel can be 
founded only on a material departure from the forms 
prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the 
jury, or on the intentional omission of the proper 
officer to summon one or more of the jurors drawn. It 
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must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in 
writing or be voted by the reporter, and must 
specifically st forth the facts constitution the ground 
of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court 
must discharge the jury so far as the trial in question 
is concerned. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for 
personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle 
accident that occurred on January 15, 1991 in Utah County, State 
of Utah (R. 1-5). In her Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff 
alleged that the Defendant William Roger Smith was negligent in 
the operation of his motor vehicle in that his negligence 
proximately caused the accident with the Plaintiff (Amended 
Complaint, R. 42-45). The Plaintiff contended in her Second 
Cause of Action against the Defendant Pleasant Grove City that 
the City was negligent in failing to determine that the stop sign 
at the intersection where the motor vehicle accident occurred was 
missing. The Plaintiff claimed that the City's negligent 
proximately caused the accident and her injuries (Amended 
Complaint, R. 38-42). 
B. Procedural History of the Case. 
1. The Plaintiff filed her Complaint on October 17, 1991 
(R. 1-5). An Amended Complaint was filed on March 10, 1992 (R. 
38-45). 
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2. The City of Pleasant Grove filed its Answer on March 25, 
1992, denying that it was negligent and claiming, as an 
affirmative defense that the Plaintiff's damages and injuries, if 
any, were caused by the Plaintiff's own negligence or the 
negligence of other third parties over whom the Defendant had no 
control (R. 49-52). 
3. The Defendant William Roger Smith and his employer Pro-
Tech Restoration d/b/a Stone Carpets filed their Answer on April 
27, 1992 denying that William Roger Smith was negligent and that 
the Plaintiff's damages and injuries, if any, were caused by the 
Plaintiff's own negligence or the negligence of third parties 
over whom the Defendants had no control (R. 55-59). 
4. On August 18, 1992, Robert L. Moody, Esq. entered his 
appearance as attorney for the Defendant William Roger Smith (R. 
107-108). Prior to Mr. Moody's appearance, the Defendant's Pro-
Tech Restoration and Mr. Smith had been represented by one 
lawyer, M. Dale Jeffs (R. 55-59). 
5. On June 23, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a motion to limit 
the number of the Defendants' peremptory challenges (R. 374-381). 
6. Pleasant Grove City filed a memorandum in opposition to 
the Plaintiff's motion to limit the number of the Defendant's 
peremptory challenges on July 9, 1993. The Defendant Pleasant 
Grove City maintained that the Defendants in this action were 
truly antagonistic in that the Plaintiff's allegations against 
each Defendant are different and required separate Answers. 
Additionally, the duties of the Defendants to Plaintiff, if any, 
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are of a different nature and require independent counsel (R. 
479-483). 
7. The Defendant, on August 12, 1993, William Roger Smith 
also filed a memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiff's motion 
to limit the number of the Defendants' peremptory challenges (R. 
487-489). 
8. On July 12, 1993 the Defendant Pro-Tech Restoration 
d/b/a/ Stone Carpets, filed its memorandum in opposition to the 
Plaintiff's motion to limit the number peremptory challenges 
available to the Defendants. Pro-Tech Restoration claimed that 
as in Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 249 P.2d 437 (Utah 1926), the 
parties in this action had interests that were adverse to each 
other (R. 515-518). 
9. As evidence of the conflict between the parties, M. Dale 
Jeffs, Esq. filed a motion of July 13, 1993, on behalf of Pro-
Tech Restoration seeking to obtain a court ruling excluding the 
Defendant William Roger Smith's prior inconsistent statements. 
In support of the motion, the Defendant Pro-Tech Restoration 
alleged as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Stone 
Carpets arises from the fact that it owned the van that 
was driven by William Roger Smith on the day 
Plaintiff's vehicle collided into the side of the Pro-
Tech Restoration van in Pleasant Grove City. 
Additionally, Roger Smith was an employee of Stone 
Carpets and working for them at the time of the 
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accident. 
2. Roger Smith gave an informal statement to the 
police officer at the scene shortly after the accident 
in which he indicated he made a "California" stop and 
slowly rolled through the intersection, after checking 
both ways. 
3. In subsequent statements given to 
investigators for both parties and the informal answer 
filed herein and a copy given to Plaintiff's attorney, 
Roger Smith indicated that the van he was driving 
stalled part way through the intersection and that it 
was while trying to re-start the vehicle that he was 
struck by Ms. Carrier. 
4. In the deposition of September 10, 1992, Roger 
Smith told Ms. Carrier's attorney the van did not stall 
in the intersection. He alleged that the Stones told 
him to say the van stalled and indicate to anyone 
questioning him that the van had stalled. He alleges 
that the Stones told him "this lady is going to sue us 
for a lot of money and we got to get out of it, " or 
words to that affect. (Deposition of William Roger 
Smith, page 67). He claimed it was implicit in their 
direction that their request was connected to his 
continued employment. (Deposition of William Roger 
Smith, page 90). 
R. 523-529. 
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10. The conflict between the Defendant William Roger Smith 
and Pro-Tech Restoration his employer, caused significant 
conflict between all of the Defendants. On July 15, 1993, the 
Plaintiff filed a trial memorandum in opposition to the 
Defendant's motion in limiting to prohibit the mentioning of 
insurance involvement. In support of the Plaintiff's position 
that the issue of insurance could be raised with the jury, the 
Plaintiff stated as follows: 
. However, Defendant's memorandum does not 
address the reason why Plaintiff intends to tell the 
jury about insurance in this case. In this case 
Plaintiff's version of the facts surrounding the 
accident are in sharp contrast to the Defendant's 
multiple versions. In this case the Defendant driver 
of the Stone's Carpet van has given several versions of 
what happened. At his deposition he admitted that he 
lied about the accident to protect his employer who was 
having trouble keeping liability insurance. The driver 
of the vehicle testified at deposition that his 
employer told him to lie to protect the employer's 
interest. For the Plaintiff to adequately address the 
issue of bias and prejudice it is necessary to get into 
the fact that the inconsistent stories were told to 
protect against the loss of insurance coverage. 
R. 542-545. 
11. The case was tried to a jury on July 15 through July 
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22, 1993, August 2nd and 3rd, 1993 and on August 16, 17 and 24, 
1993 (R. 818-825). The jury rendered its decision by answering 
the questions contained on the Special Verdict. The jury found 
the Defendant William Roger Smith 40% negligent and the 
Plaintiff, Shirley Carrier, 60% negligent. The jury found that 
the Defendant Pleasant Grove City was not negligent (R. 815-817). 
12. Judgment on the jury verdict was entered on August 24, 
1993 (R. 828-830). 
13. The Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on September 2, 1993 (R. 860-861). 
After consideration of the extensive memoranda (R. 862-886, 921-
927, 929-955, 976-995), Judge Ray M. Harding denied the 
Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or 
in the alternative, for a new trial (R. 1006-1008). 
14. Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from order pursuant 
to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on November 
12, 1993. The Plaintiff cited, as a basis for the motion, the 
Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 
(Utah 1993) (R. 1010-1024). 
15. The Defendant Pleasant Grove City filed a response to 
the Plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) on November 22, 
1993 (R. 1028-1036). The Defendant Pro-Tech Restoration filed 
its memorandum in opposition on November 23, 1993 (R. 1038-
1046). 
16. On November 23, 1993 the court entered its Order 
finding: 
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The Court noted that at the time of the 
hearing in chambers on the motion to limit 
peremptory challenges, the Court made findings at 
that time that there was sufficient adversity between 
the various Defendants, that each Defendant was 
entitled to separate peremptory challenges. 
Accordingly, the Court now, denies the Motion for 
Relief from Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
a New Trial. 
R. 1047-1048. 
17. The Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on November 
23, 1993 (R. 1036.1-1036.3). 
18. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Disposition filed 
with the Utah Supreme Court was denied on January 10, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The accident at issue in this case occurred on Tuesday, 
January 15, 1991 at the intersection of 1100 North and 500 East 
in Pleasant Grove, Utah. The investigating officer noted that 
the accident occurred during the daytime in cloudy conditions and 
that it was snowing and the roads were slick at the time of his 
investigation (T., Vol. II at 1409-1415, 1443-1445). 
2. The Defendant William Roger Smith told the investigating 
officer at the scene that he was Southbound on 500 East, did not 
see a stop sign and proceeded into the intersection. Mr. Smith 
explained that the Plaintiff, Ms. Carrier was proceeding up the 
hill, Eastbound on 1100 North and they collided (T., Vol. II at 
9 
1428). 
3. At trial, the Defendant, William Roger Smith testified 
that he was 26 years of age and had a high school education (T. 
Vol. Ill at 1453-1459). At the time of the accident, the 
Defendant was employed by the Defendant Stone Carpets as a carpet 
cleaner (T., Vol. Ill at 1463). On January 15, 1991 the 
Defendant William Roger Smith was operating a blue van owned by 
Stone Carpets (T., Vol. Ill at 1468). The Defendant Smith 
testified that he was traveling at approximately 15 mph and 
slowed down as he entered the intersection where the accident 
occurred. The Defendant observed the Plaintiff's vehicle for 
the first time, to his right at a distance of twenty to fifty 
feet (T., Vol. Ill at 1482, 1489-1490). The Defendant Smith 
observed the Plaintiff "flying up the hill," going approximately 
40 mph (T., Vol. Ill at 1578, 1580, 1583, 1586, 1587-1588). The 
Plaintiff's vehicle struck the van the Defendant was operating 
towards the back of the van (T., Vol. Ill at 1493). 
4. The Defendant Smith testified that he made a 
"California" stop at the intersection by slowing down to a 
sufficient speed in order to allow the vehicle to stop if on-
coming traffic was observed (T., Vol. Ill at 1500-1501). 
5. The Defendant Smith testified that shortly after the 
accident he was instructed by his employers Joe Stone and Jim 
Stone, 
To say that when — I slowed down to look 
through the intersection. When I proceeded to go 
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through the intersection the van stalled and it 
slowly went through the intersection. * It didn't 
start back up. And Ms. Carrier came up the hill 
and wrecked into me. 
T., Vol. Ill at 1517-1518. The Defendant Smith was told by 
Stone that he should tell the investigators the information set 
out above, "because this lady is going to sue us" and that story 
would attribute more fault to the Plaintiff, Ms. Carrier (T., 
Vol. Ill at 1519). The Defendant Smith explicitly testified that 
Joe Stone was asking him to lie (T., Vol. Ill at 1520-1523). 
6. Pursuant to the instruction of Joe Stone, the Defendant 
William Roger Smith told the investigator that the van stalled on 
January 18, 1991 (T., Vol. Ill at 1522, 1528, 1530, 1532). The 
Defendant Smith gave another inaccurate statement on January 25, 
1991, again detailing how the van he was driving stalled (T., 
Vol. Ill at 1546, 1549-1550). 
7. The Defendant William Roger Smith filed a Pro se Answer 
to the Plaintiff's Complaint in this action which he again 
detailed that the van had stalled as he entered the intersection 
(T., Vol. Ill at 1557-1559). 
8. The Defendant Smith did not feel that it was appropriate 
to fabricate a version of the facts that was not true and 
accordingly, the Defendant Smith told Plaintiff's counsel his 
memory of the accident at the time his deposition was taken (T., 
Vol. Ill at 1561-1563). 
9. Arlen Shupe testified that he was an employee of Stone 
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Carpets and was following the Defendant Smith at the time of the 
accident which occurred at 5:00 or 5:30 in the afternoon. Shupe 
testified that the roads where the accident occurred had one lane 
in each direction (T., Vol. Ill at 1631-1632). Shupe testified 
that the Plaintiff was traveling at 35 mph (T., Vol. Ill at 
1639). 
10. The Plaintiff, Shirley Carrier testified that as she 
proceeded Eastbound on 1100 North that, 
. . . all of a sudden I just seen this car 
coming from the side road. 
T., Vol. VI at 2041-2042. The Plaintiff testified that she did 
not have time to react or brake (T., Vol. VI at 2042). The 
Plaintiff conceded that Smith was in the intersection prior to 
the time her vehicle entered the intersection (T., Vol. VI at 
2057-2058). 
11. Paul Thomas Blotter testified that he had received a 
Masters in Mechanical Engineering and a Ph.D from Michigan State 
University (T., Vol. VII at 2114-2115). Dr. Blotter testified 
after a review of the evidence in the case and an inspection of 
the intersection and the Dodge van involved in the accident, 
that the van driven by the Defendant Smith was moving 5 to 10 mph 
prior to impact (T., Vol. VII at 2170). Dr. Blotter testified 
that the Toyota, driven by the Plaintiff was traveling between 25 
and 30 mph prior to impact (T., Vol. VII at 2171, 2301-2302). 
Dr. Blotter also testified that had the Plaintiff reacted to the 
Defendant, Smith's presence and braked, the accident could have 
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been avoided (T., Vol. IX at 2301-2311). Blotter also testified 
that the Defendant Smith was clearly in the intersection before 
the Plaintiff, Carrier (T., Vol. 10 at 2301-2310). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly ruled that the divergent interests 
of the Defendants constituted a "substantial controversy" 
entitling each Defendant to their separate preemptory challenges. 
The court properly instructed the jury with regard to the 
issue of right-of-way. The instruction used by the court was a 
proper and sufficient statement regarding the law and presented 
the theories advanced by the parties with regard to right-of-way. 
Finally, the court did not commit any error in requiring 
Newell Knight to take the stand or with regard to the scope of 
the questions posed to Mr. Knight on cross-examination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN GRANTING 
EACH OF THE PARTIES FOUR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
A. Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 47(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the 
award of peremptory challenges allowed to each party during the 
selection of a jury. The Rule states as follows: 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of 
peremptory challenges. The Challenges to individual 
jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party 
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, 
except as provided under Subdivisions (b) [alternate 
jurors] and (c). (Emphasis added.) 
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Rule 47(b) allows each party an additional peremptory 
challenge in the selection of alternate jurors, and Subdivision 
(c) states that either party may challenge the jurors but 
requires multiple parties on the same side of the lawsuit to 
join in a challenge before it can be made. 
The clear meaning of Rule 47 is that multiple parties on 
either side of a lawsuit "must join in the challenge before it 
can be made." 
B. Utah Case Law Interpreting Rule 47 URCP. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in addressing similar language prior 
to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, held that co-
parties are not deemed to be on the "same side" of a lawsuit if 
there interest are "truly adverse." Sutton v. Otis, 68 Utah 85, 
141, 249 P. 437, 457-458 (1926). In Sutton, one of the 
defendants acknowledged responsibility for the elevator mishap 
and aided the plaintiff in establishing the liability of the 
other defendant. In a separate action, the two defendants 
litigated in federal court to determine their respective 
liability for damages arising out of the same set of facts. In 
the State action, the trial court refused to allow one defendant 
to exercise a peremptory challenge because the other defendant 
refused to join in making the challenge. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that it was prejudicial error to require the defendants to 
exercise their peremptory challenges together when their interest 
were clearly adverse and hostile. Id. 
After the Utah Supreme Court! s decision in Sutton v. Otis, 
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supra, the Court did not have an opportunity to address the issue 
again until Randle v. Allen, 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 862 P.2d 1329 
(Utah 1993). In Randle, the Plaintiff Steven Randle filed suit 
for the wrongful death of his wife, Rosan Randle, against the 
driver of the other vehicle, Carl Allen and Salt Lake County and 
the Utah Department of Transportation. The facts at trial 
revealed that the Randle vehicle collided with the truck driven 
by Allen in an intersection. Mr. Randle sued claiming Allen was 
negligent in the operation of his vehicle and that UDOT and Salt 
Lake County were negligent in the design and maintenance of the 
intersection where the accident occurred. The Defendant Allen 
counterclaimed for medical expenses, lost wages and damage to his 
truck. The jury returned a verdict finding Mrs. Randle 80% 
negligent. 
On appeal, Allen argued that each of the three Defendants 
had separate counsel, had filed separate answers and therefore, 
their interest were adverse. Id. In response, the Court held, 
. that these factors by themselves do not 
establish the existence of adverse interests for 
purposes of the Rule. Indeed, Sutton stated that extra 
peremptory challenges should be granted to multiple 
parties only if there is "a substantial controversy 
between them respecting the subject-matter of the 
suit." 68 Utah at 141, 249 P. at 457. Otherwise, 
parties on the same side of a lawsuit should join in 
exercising the allowed challenges. Id. Sutton held 
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that a "substantial controversy" did not exist simply 
because co-parties were uncooperative and attempted to 
shift liability to the other. _Id. at 144, 249 P. at 
458. 
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Sutton that extra 
peremptory challenges should be allowed only when a "substantial 
controversy" exists between the co-parties. ^d. The Court then 
delegated to the trial judge the responsibility of carefully 
appraising the degree "of adverseness among co-parties and 
determining] whether that adverseness truly warrants giving 
that side more challenges than the other." _Id. The Court 
continued: 
In our view, a "substantial controversy" exists 
when a party on one side of a lawsuit has a cross-claim 
against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a 
separate, distinct lawsuit from the action existing 
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants. When, however, 
a cross-claim is merely a derivative of the original 
action, such as a cross-claim for indemnification or 
contribution, a "substantial controversy" does not 
exist for the purposes of Rule 47. 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that Allen's interest were 
adverse to those of the UDOT and County because of his claim for 
damages based upon negligent design and maintenance of the 
intersection. The Court found that no substantial controversy 
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existed between the County and UDOT in that both of them asserted 
that Randle or Allen were responsible for the accident. The 
Court found that they had common interests in defending the 
condition and design of the intersection. Accordingly, the Court 
held that allowing UDOT and the County to exercise separate 
peremptory challenges, was error. 
C. Applicable Standard of Review. 
The Plaintiff argues that the issue relating to Rule 47 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is one involving the 
interpretation of a Statute and therefore is reviewed by this 
Court for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P. 2d 1355, 1357 
(Utah 1993); Ward v. Richfield City, 793 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 
1990) (Appellant's Brief at 1). 
It is respectfully submitted that the interpretation of Rule 
47 is not at issue in this case. Rule 47 and the interpreting 
case law make it clear that if a "substantial controversy" 
exists between co-defendants, each are entitled to separate 
peremptory challenges. The issue in this case is therefore the 
application of the facts to the stated principles of law. To 
that end, the Supreme Court in Randle, supra, held that it was 
the trial court's responsibility to: 
Carefully appraise the degree of adverseness 
among co-parties and determine whether that 
adverseness truly warrants giving that side more 
challenges than the other. 
Id. 
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As noted by the Court in State v. Gordon,, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 
55 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
Trial courts are generally accorded some 
degree of discretion in applying a legal standard 
to a given set of facts. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 937 (Utah 1994). Such "discretion" allows the 
trial court "to reach one of several possible 
conclusions about the legal affect of a particular 
set of facts without risking reversal." Id.. The 
Pena court likened the degree of discretion accorded 
a trial court to a "pasture," the boundaries of 
which are determined by "fences" erected by 
appellate courts. Id. 
Accordingly, the standard to be applied in this case is one 
of "abuse of discretion." 
As demonstrated below, Judge Harding determined that the 
facts of the case warranted a finding that the three Defendants 
were disparate enough to warrant the award of separate 
peremptory challenges. A party challenging a trial court's 
finding has the heavy burden of establishing that those findings 
are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Utah 
Appellate Courts have clearly held that to meet the burden, an 
appellant must marshall all of the evidence supporting the 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even in viewing them in the 
light most favorable to the trial court. Consolidation Coal v. 
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Utah Div. of State Lands, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1994); 
Procon Corp. v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 876 P.2d 890 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, the Appellant has not met the burden of 
marshaling the evidence as it relates to the peremptory challenge 
issue and accordingly, the court should refuse to address this 
issue in its entirety. Fitzgereld v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). This Court has shown no reluctance in 
affirming when the appellant fails to adequately marshall the 
evidence. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 171 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 
(Utah App. 1990); Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939 (Utah App. 
1990). If the Court proceeds to address the issue for any 
reason, it should be based upon an abuse of discretion standard. 
D. The Facts of this Case Support the Award of 
Peremptory Challenges to Each of the Defendants. 
1. Substantial Controversy as it Relates to 
Pleasant Grove City. 
The Plaintiff has conceded that the position of Pleasant 
Grove City is sufficiently adverse to the other parties to 
warrant an award of separate peremptory challenges. In the 
hearing conducted on Thursday, July 15, 1993, prior to trial, the 
following interchange took place between the court and Mr. Lynn 
Harris, attorney for the Plaintiff: 
The Court: We're meeting in chambers. An the 
court has indicated on Plaintiff's motion to strike, 
plus the supplemental designation of witnesses, that 
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that motion is denied. 
The next was a motion to limit Defendants' 
number of preemptory challenges, or in the 
alternative increase the number of preemptories 
permitted by the Plaintiff. I'm going to deny that 
motion, buy indicate to counsel that I am going 
to have one alternate juror. And if you all 
want four preemptories I'll give you all four, 
but otherwise, only upon mutual agreement. 
What do you want to do? Do you want four for 
a preemptory? 
Mr. Harris: Three plus one? I think so. 
Your Honor, would it be appropriate -- I 
don't know if you looked at that case we quoted 
about how there's got to be a disparate interest 
situation in there -- and I clearly will not 
dispute Pleasant Grove City has disparate 
interests, but I'm a little interested in how 
Smith and Stone have disparate interests. And 
Mr. Jeffs' response was just they -- no response. 
Somewhere along the lines if there's going to be 
grounds for having equal preemptories each, I at 
least ought to have the opportunity of knowing 
exactly what it is that makes them so disparate 
in their claims when Mr. Moody gets to have three 
and Mr. Jeffs gets to have three, when in many 
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respects it is close to that case. It just seems 
to me, for the record, so I can understand that, we 
need to argue that or deal with it so we can advance 
our argument now. 
The Court: Counsel, I feel that they are 
disparate enough, just by the nature of the case, 
to permit it. I don't think we need that. 
(Emphasis added). 
Tr. 7/15/93 hearing, Addendum, Exhibit 1. 
The Plaintiff's concession that the Defendant Pleasant Grove 
City has clearly disparate interests is clearly supported by the 
evidence in this case. The Plaintiff addressed Pleasant Grove 
City's responsibility in the Second Cause of Action of her 
Amended Complaint. The Plaintiff alleged that the agents and 
employees of the City failed to timely report the removal of the 
stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred and 
replace the same; and, further failed to configure the signs at 
the intersection in a safe manner (R. 38-45). The theory of 
negligence employed by the Plaintiff is entirely different than 
the theory relied upon against the Defendants William Roger Smith 
and Stone Carpets. In addition to the difference in the theory 
relied upon, the range of proof was entirely different. Counsel 
for Pleasant Grove City had to prepare for and evaluate the 
witnesses that would be called on the issues of the existence of 
the stop sign, its removal, the duty to detect the absence of 
the sign and the effect of the absence on the accident scenario. 
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All of the above remove the issues relating to Pleasant Grove 
City from those faced by the other Defendants. Although Pleasant 
Grove City did not file a cross-claim, it contended by 
affirmative defense that the accident and any injuries or damage 
resulting therefrom, were the result of the conduct of the 
Plaintiff or other third-parties (R. 49-52). 
While it is true that the Court in Randle, supra, noted the 
existence of an independent lawsuit between Allen and the two 
governmental defendants, the Court relied upon the basic 
difference in theory of recovery to justify the award of separate 
preemptory challenges. In this case, the position of Pleasant 
Grove City is clearly separate and distinct than that of the 
other Defendants. The allegations by the Plaintiff were 
different as to the City and the proof relating to the 
establishment of a defected intersection was exclusively a matter 
that counsel for the City had to deal with. The scrutiny of a 
jury panel based upon the facts exclusively tied to Pleasant 
Grove's responsibility justified the award of separate preemptory 
challenges. In sum, Pleasant Grove was attempting to show that 
the Plaintiff was negligent, which would align it with Defendant 
Smith. Pleasant Grove was attempting to establish that the 
Defendant Smith was liable, aligning it with the Plaintiff. 
Finally, Pleasant Grove was solely responsible to establish that 
the intersection was not dangerous or defective which would align 
it with none of the Defendants. 
One additional note should be made as it relates to Pleasant 
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Grove City. Common defendants in a lawsuit, although clearly 
diverse, may forego "finger pointing" at other defendants if the 
plaintiff is having difficulty during the course of the trial in 
establishing his or her case. The appellant points to the 
witnesses that were called and other trial tactics to evidence a 
lack of "substantial controversy." That analogy is totally 
unfair. Whether or not Pleasant Grove or the other Defendants 
could afford to forego attacking other Defendants is a function 
of how the trial and evidence proceed. The ascertainment of 
whether a substantial controversy exists must be made from the 
facts existing before trial uninfluenced by trial tactics. 
2. Substantial Controversy as it Relates to 
Stone Carpets. 
A casual examination of the facts in this case would reveal 
that the Defendant Smith was the driver of the vehicle involved 
in the accident and that the Defendant, Stone Carpets, as his 
employer, could only be liable if Smith was determined to be 
negligent. However, as developed in the Statement of Facts, 
although both Stone Carpets and Smith had a common interest in 
establishing the Plaintiff and Defendant Pleasant Grove's 
negligence and Smith's lack thereof, there was a substantial 
controversy between Smith and Stone Carpets warranting separate 
counsel and the right to separate preemptory challenges. 
As outlined in the Statement of Facts, the Defendant Smith 
and Stone Carpets were originally represented by the same 
counsel, M. Dale Jeffs. However, at the time that the Defendant 
Smith's deposition was taken, Mr. Smith alleged that Joe Stone of 
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Stone Carpets met with him and told him to lie to the 
investigators concerning some of the factual aspects of the 
accident. Specifically, Joe Stone told the Defendant Smith to 
fabricate a story that his van stalled while entering the 
intersection at the time of the accident. That scenario would 
act to decrease the speed of the Smith vehicle and increase the 
time the Plaintiff would allegedly have to view Smith and react. 
The record reveals that Joe Stone denied having any such 
conversation with William Roger Smith. Obviously, the two 
parties had truly adverse interest in the case. Since both 
parties were accusing the other of lying about what happened, it 
would be impossible for the Defendant Stone Carpets and Roger 
Smith to have their interests protected by the same preemptory 
challenges. 
In addition to the obvious controversy between Stone Carpets 
and Smith, the disagreement poured over into evidentiary areas. 
At the time of trial, the Defendant Smith had given several 
statements to investigators and testified at deposition. Because 
Smith and Stone Carpets were represented by separate counsel, 
each had to prepare for the varying stories at trial. Smith's 
testimony could greatly impact the foundation upon which the 
expert reconstructionist testified. Stone Carpets had to be 
prepared to impeach Smith and Smith had to prepare the delicate 
issues surrounding his conversation with Joe Stone. Smith and 
Stone had to prepare for the Plaintiff's exploitation of the 
controversy. The Plaintiff was attempting to use the controversy 
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as a basis to introduce insurance into the case which was highly 
resisted by the Defendant, Stone Carpets. The Defendant Smith's 
testimony greatly affected that issue which separated to a 
greater degree the interest of the Defendant Stone Carpets and 
William Roger Smith. 
Although the issue of liability is similar between Stone and 
Smith, the extreme conflict that developed regarding essential 
elements of the accident scenario justified the determination 
that their trial tactics could differ and certainly that their 
standing vis a vie the Plaintiff was different justifying the 
award of preemptory challenges. It must be kept in mind that the 
Court in Randle, supra, and Otis, supra, was only faced with 
issues regarding divergence on legal issues such as negligence 
and causation. Certainly, within the term "substantial 
controversy," there must be a consideration of "degree of 
adverseness" that contemplates facts similar to those presented 
in an analysis of the position of Stone Carpets and William Roger 
Smith. After all, the adversity between Smith and Stone Carpets 
was greater than that normally existing between plaintiffs and 
defendants. 
E. Any Error of the Trial Court was not Prejudicial Error. 
In Randle, the appellant contended that the improper 
allowance of preemptory challenges allowed the defendants to 
manipulate the jury selection and seat a jury consisting solely 
of men. _Id. The Utah Supreme Court excused the plaintiff from 
demonstrating prejudice, the Court did so based upon the size of 
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the disparity. Id.. 
In this case, the Plaintiff has not developed for purposes 
of this appeal any theory that would support the argument that 
the final outcome was manipulated or controlled by the award of 
preemptory challenges. Additionally, the size of the claimed 
disparity is significantly reduced by the Plaintiff's concession 
that Pleasant Grove City had disparate interests justifying the 
award of separate preemptory challenges. 
Inasmuch as the Appellant has failed to argue any theory 
upon which this Court could conclude that the jury panel was 
manipulated to a certain end and inasmuch as the disparity is 
significantly reduced by the Plaintiff's concession regarding 
Pleasant Grove City, any error by the trial court could not be 
viewed as prejudicial. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE THE RIGHT-OF-WAY INSTRUCTION OFFERED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
The Plaintiff submitted proposed instruction 19 as the 
embodiment of her theory regarding the right-of-way of the 
intersection where the accident occurred: 
You are instructed that Utah Code Annotated 
41-6-72(2) provides: when more than one vehicle 
enters or approaches an intersection from different 
highways at approximately the same time at the 
intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic 
control device; 
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(b) is not regulated because the traffic 
control device is inoperative; or 
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop 
signs, 
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the 
right-of-way to the vehicle on the right unless other-
wise directed by a police officer. 
If you find, after preponderance of the evidence, 
that William Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle 
in violation of the foregoing statute, such conduct 
creates a presumption of negligence. 
R. 19, Addendum, Exhibit 2. 
The Defendant Pro-Tech Restoration d/b/a Stone Carpets 
contended that Utah Code Annotated 41-6-72(2) (1953 as Amended) 
presented only the Plaintiff's theory of the case. As evidenced 
by the testimony of Dr. Blotter, the Defendant Pro-Tech 
Restoration claimed that the vehicles did not enter the 
intersection at "approximately the same time," and therefore 
Subsection 1 of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-72 was the appropriate 
Section. Accordingly, Pro-Tech submitted proposed instruction 
number 55 which provides: 
You are instructed that the Utah Code Annotated 
41-6-72(1) provides: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an 
intersection not regulated by an official traffic 
control device shall yield the right-of-way to any 
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vehicle that has entered the intersection from a 
different highway. 
You are instructed that the Utah Code Annotated 
41-6-72(2) provides: 
(2) When more than one vehicle enters or 
approaches an intersection from different 
highways at approximately the same time and the 
intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic 
control device; 
(b) is not regulated because the traffic 
control device is inoperative; or 
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop 
signs, 
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall 
yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right 
unless otherwise directed by a police officer. 
R. 558, Addendum, Exhibit 2. 
The Defendant Pro-Tech offered proposed instruction number 
36 which provides: 
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection 
at approximately the same time and distance from it, 
the driver approaching on the right has the right-of-
way, and it is the duty of the driver approaching on 
the left to yield the right-of-way. 
A driver entering an intersection first has the 
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right-of-way. However, a driver may not speed up to 
enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the 
right-of-way by entering the intersection slightly 
ahead of another driver. In order for a driver 
approaching from the left to take the right-of-way, 
that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead 
of the driver approaching from the right. 
R. 646, Addendum, Exhibit 2. 
The court, after receiving the proposed instructions from 
the parties including an instruction from Defendant Stone Carpets 
that cited only Subsection 1 of UCA 41-6-72 (1953 as Amended) (R. 
702, Addendum, Exhibit 2 ) , gave the following instruction 
regarding right-of-way: 
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection 
at approximately the same time and distance from it, 
the driver approaching on the right has the right-
of-way, and it is the duty of the driver approaching on 
the left to yield the right-of-way. 
A driver entering an intersection first has the 
right-of-way. However, a driver may not speed up to 
enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the 
right-of-way by entering the intersection slightly 
ahead of another driver. In order for a driver 
approaching from the left to take the right-of-way, 
that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead 
of the driver approaching from the right. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that it is "the 
duty of the court to cover the theories of both parties in his 
instructions." Startin v. Madsen, 237 P.2d 834 (1951). The Utah 
Supreme Court has reenforced this concept more recently in 
stating: 
It is well recognized that the parties are 
entitled to have their theories of the case 
presented to the jury in the form of instructions, 
but only if they are supported by the evidence. 
Powers v. Gene's Building Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 176 
(1977). 
There is no question that the Plaintiff's theory of the case 
was included in the court's instruction number 31. The trial 
court simply deleted the subparagraphs over which there was no 
dispute in this case. As edited by the court, if two vehicles 
approach an unregulated intersection at approximately the same 
time, the operator of the vehicle on the left must yield to the 
operator on the right. There was absolutely no harm or prejudice 
caused by deleting the subparagraphs of Plaintiff's proposed 
instruction number 19. 
The second paragraph of the trial court's instruction number 
31 deals with the circumstance when one driver enters the 
intersection clearly ahead of another driver. There is nothing 
that is internally inconsistent with the instruction. In 
essence, the trial court gave and edited version of Utah Code 
Annotated 41-6-72(1) and (2) (1990 as Amended). The Statute is 
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not ambiguous or contradictory and neither is the court's 
instruction. While it is true that the Plaintiff has a right to 
have the jury instructed in her theory of the case, so does the 
Defendant. The court, in a less confusing manner than presented 
by separate instructions, gave the jury the alternate theories in 
one instruction. The jury received instruction as to the right-
of-way if they found that the vehicles entered the intersection 
at the same time and also received instruction of the law 
regarding right-of-way if they found that one vehicle was in fact 
in the intersection clearly ahead of the other. 
Dr. Blotter testified that three seconds before the point of 
impact the Dodge van driven by Mr. Smith was only thirty feet 
from the point of impact or at the approach of the intersection. 
The Toyota van, driven by the Plaintiff would have been one 
hundred and twenty-six feet back from the point of impact, three 
seconds before the accident (T., Vol. 10 at 2301-2310). 
The Appellate court reviews challenges to jury instructions 
under a "correctness" standard. Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Corporation, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Knapstad 
v. Smith's Management Corporation, 774 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 
1989). Inasmuch as the instruction clearly mirrors and 
accurately embodies the substance of the Statute and presents the 
parties' various theories regarding the principle of right-of-
way, it was appropriate and proper. 
It should be noted that although the Defendant argues that 
the instruction did not present the Plaintiff's theory in a 
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"clear and understandable way," the appellant provides absolutely 
no analysis to support that conclusion. Contrary to the 
assertion of the Plaintiff, the instruction fairly and adequately 
dealt with the two possible factual situations affecting right-
of-way. 
POINT III: THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN ALLOWING 
NEWELL KNIGHT TO TESTIFY. 
A. The Appellant did not Object to the Manner in Which 
Witness Newell Knight was Called. 
The Plaintiff first contends with regard to Newell Knight's 
testimony that: 
Over Ms. Carrier's objections, however, the 
court allowed Mr. Knight to take the stand and 
testify (T., Vol. 10 at 2439). 
Appellant's brief at 28. 
The Record cited by the Appellant simply does not support 
her position. The Transcript reads as follows: 
The Court: You may call your next witness. 
Mr. Harris: It was my intention at this time, 
the last is to simply read about -- I hate to do it 
again, but read a bunch of pages from Newell Knight's 
deposition, which I took on the 27th day of April, 
1993. 
And I would just ask that — I'll read both parts and 
do it quickly and be finished. 
The Court: Any objection? 
Mr. Jeffs: Not to the generalization he wants to 
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read some parts. And as far as Mr. Knight's background 
is concerned, I informed the court earlier we would 
not agree to a reading of the deposition, and we had 
objections to foundation and his testimony. 
The Court: Very well. We'll need to have Mr. 
Knight called as a witness. 
Mr. Harris: Your Honor --
Mr. Chipman: He's out in the hall. 
Mr. Harris: May I approach the bench before 
we do that? 
The Court: You may. 
(Bench conference held) 
The Court: [whereupon Newell Knight was called 
to the stand] 
T., Vol. 10 at 2438-2439. 
At the time of the jury instruction conference, Mr. Chipman, 
attorney for Pleasant Grove indicated that he was not certain 
that he would call Mr. Knight as a witness. At that time, 
counsel for the Plaintiff informed the court that if Mr. Chipman 
did not call Mr. Knight, he was prepared and intended to read 
certain parts of Mr. Knight's deposition. Over the objection of 
the Defendants, the court ruled that since Newell Knight had been 
designated by a witness by Mr. Chipman and had been allowed to be 
deposed, the Plaintiff could call Mr. Knight as a witness. At 
that time, counsel for Stone Carpets indicated that he objected 
to the foundation for Mr. Knight's opinions and the court ruled 
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that Mr, Knight would have to be present if his deposition was to 
be read so that he could be subjected to cross-examination. 
As clearly indicated above, counsel for the Plaintiff did 
not object to the ruling of the trial court with regard to the 
manner in which Newell Knight was called and is prohibited with 
raising the issue on appeal. Skyline Leasing v. Datacap, 535 
P.2d 512 (Utah 1976); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, lnc.r 682 
P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 
P.2d 892 (Utah 1988). 
B. The Cross-Examination of Newell Knight was done in 
Accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
After calling Newell Knight to the stand, Plaintiff's 
counsel read the desired portions of Newell Knight's deposition 
(T., Vol. 10 at 2440-2472). Newell Knight was asked from his 
deposition, questions relating to the speed of the vehicles (T., 
Vol. 10 at 2454-2458); the underlining data supporting the 
computations of speed (T., Vol. 10 at 2449-2461); the evidence of 
braking prior to impact (T., Vol. 10 at 2462-2463); and, 
perception in reaction time (T., Vol. 10 at 2467-2471). 
On cross-examination, counsel for Pro-Tech Restoration 
cross-examined Mr. Knight regarding the fact that he did not 
conduct an accident reconstruction of the accident himself and 
was merely using the computations utilized by Dr. Limpert to come 
to his conclusions (T., Vol. 10 at 2472-2477). 
As argued in Appellant's brief, Newell Knight was then asked 
whether he had an opinion as to who had the right-of-way at the 
intersection at the time of the accident. Mr. Knight indicated 
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that he did and testified that Mr. Smith had the right-of-way, in 
his opinion (T., Vol. 10 at 2477-2478). 
On re-direct, counsel for the Plaintiff interrogated Newell 
Knight extensively regarding right-of-way and Newell Knight's 
opinion with regard thereto (T., Vol. 10 at 2479-2484, 2485-2493, 
2496-2497). 
Contrary to the assertion contained in Appellant's brief, 
Newell Knight was not asked any questions with regard to the 
interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-72 (1990 as Amended) 
on cross-examination (Appellant's brief at 28). Instead, it was 
during the extensive re-direct examination by Plaintiff in which 
Mr. Harris, attorney for the Plaintiff, launched into a 
discussion of the Statute and its interpretation. It was Mr. 
Harris who involved Newell Knight in the interpretation of the 
Statute regarding right-of-way. 
Plaintiff claims that the questions posed to Mr. Knight by 
the Defendants regarding right-of-way constituted impermissible 
cross-examination. It is well established that the trial court 
has broad discretion with regard to its rulings relating to the 
scope of cross-examination. As noted by Judge Harding the court 
had allowed broad and extensive cross-examination by counsel of 
all witnesses: 
The Court: The court has during the course of the 
trial granted examination outside the scope of either 
cross or direct, as the case may have been, simply in 
their interests of time. The witness was available, 
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could have been recalled by either party. The 
formality of limiting them in scope didn't seem 
appropriate in those general circumstances. 1 have 
done that in cases where the court has felt that it was 
appropriate for other reasons. I didn't see that in 
this case. And as to that specific issue, Mr. Knight 
had been called as an expert, dually qualified, and I 
think testified within the scope of that expertise. 
And he can be argued with, you can either accept or 
reject, as may the jury. When we get ot the point of 
instruction in the law they, if course, are going to be 
told that what I tell them the law is, it is and 
they're not to ignore it. And that will be the law in 
the case, if they're awake to hear it. 
T., Vol. 10 at 2525-2526. 
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Whitehead v. American 
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990), "the proper scope 
of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse. 
After having been extensively questioned regarding the speed 
of the vehicles at the time of impact and before, there was not a 
large jump to ask Mr. Knight, in essence, who entered the 
intersection first and therefore had the right-of-way. It is 
totally unrealistic for Plaintiff's counsel to believe that he 
could extract all the information regarding the accident 
including damage to the vehicles, movement of the vehicles during 
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the accident scenario and their respective speeds and expect that 
defense counsel would be precluded from having the witness use 
those speed calculations to testify where the vehicles were in 
relation to each other as they approached the intersection. As 
carefully documented above, it was counsel for the Plaintiff that 
involved Mr. Knight in a discussion regarding the right-of-way 
Statute and its interpretation. Defense counsel simply asked the 
question regarding Newell Knight's opinion of right-of-way based 
upon his calculations of speed and the position of vehicles (T., 
Vol. 10 at 2477-2478). 
C. Newell Knight Testified Properly and within the Bounds 
Established for an Expert. 
Plaintiff argues that Mr. Knight was allowed to testify 
improperly on questions of law (Appellant's brief at 29-30). As 
established above, defense counsel asked Mr. Knight a question 
regarding his opinion of right-of-way. It was Plaintiff's 
counsel who interrogated Mr. Knight regarding the interpretation 
of the right-of-way Statute. 
As noted by the Court in Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 
(Utah 1991), "in reviewing the admissibility of evidence at 
trial, we give deference to the trial court's advantageous 
position and do not overturn the result unless it is clear the 
trial court errored." The Court continued by citing Rule 704 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence and stated that "testimony in the form 
of opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact." 
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The Record is clear that Mr. Knight was not asked any 
questions regarding "negligence" but only questions regarding 
right-of-way based upon the position of the cars as they entered 
the intersection. 
In reviewing questions regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony, this Court reviews the issues under a deferential 
"clear error" standard. See Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Corporation, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah App. 1991); Davidson v. 
Prince, supra at 1230; State v. Kinsey, 797 P. 2d 424, 427 (Utah 
App. 1990). Further, an appellant bares the burden of 
demonstrating that the excluded evidence could have influenced 
the jury to render a different verdict. Anton v. Thomas, 806 
P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Davidson, supra the Court held that the trial court 
properly excluded an expert opinion that the defendant was 
negligent. In doing so, the Court stated that "questions which 
allow a witness to simply tell a jury what result to reach are 
not permitted." _Id. at 1231. The Court noted however that a 
witness may testify as to the parties' actions, including whether 
a party acted with care. Id.. In this case Newell Knight was 
asked only his opinion regarding right-of-way and was not asked 
questions regarding negligence or percentage apportionment of 
fault. 
The testimony elicited from Newell Knight was permissible 
and within the bounds established by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
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The facts of this case clearly establish that Pleasant Grove 
City had interests that separated it from the other two 
Defendants. The Defendants' position in that regard is bolstered 
by the Plaintiff's acknowledgment that Pleasant Grove was 
entitled to separate preemptory challenges. There can be no 
question that a substantial controversy existed between 
Defendants Smith and Stone Carpets. The Record is replete with 
serious accusations of witness tampering that would make it 
impossible for the two Defendants to cooperate. The differences 
between the two Defendants influenced legal issues and factual 
issues surrounding the manner in which the accident occurred. 
There was substantial evidence upon which the trial court 
determined that each of the Defendants was entitled to their 
separate preemptory challenges. Absent an abuse of discretion, 
this Court should not overturn the Ruling of the trial court. 
There is no basis in the Record to establish that the trial 
court errored in submitting the instruction regarding right-of-
way. In accordance with the proposed instructions by the 
parties, the court gave the statutory instruction embodying the 
theories advanced by both the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The 
instruction properly characterized the Statute and was not, in 
any regard, misleading or confusing. 
Finally, the court's Rulings with regard to the testimony of 
Newell Knight were appropriate and in accordance with the Rules 
of Evidence. Defense counsel did not impermissibly exceed the 
scope of direct-examination and the testimony regarding right-of-
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way was not an ultimate issue of fact proscribed by Appellate 
court rulings. 
Accordingly, the Judgment on the Verdict rendered in this 
case should be maintained and the appeal of the Plaintiff denied. 
DATED this ff \ pJrday of February, 1995. 
^k*- j W\~J, 
Robert L. Moody,\ EsqL 
Attorney for Deffendaiit/Appellee 
William Roger Smith 
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E x h i b i t 1: T r a n s c r i p t o f Hearing 7 / 1 5 / 9 3 
1 
1 THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1993 
2 (IN CHAMBERS PRIOR TO TRIAL) 
3 THE COURT: WE'RE MEETING IN CHAMBERS. AND 
4 THE COURT HAS INDICATED ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE, 
5 PLUS THE SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES, THAT THAT 
6 MOTION IS DENIED. 
7 THE NEXT WAS A MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANTS* 
8 NUMBER OF PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
9 INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PREEMPTORIES PERMITTED BY THE 
10 PLAINTIFF. I'M GOING TO DENY THAT MOTION, BUT INDICATE 
11 TO COUNSEL THAT I AM GOING TO HAVE ONE ALTERNATE JUROR. 
12 AND IF YOU ALL WANT FOUR PREEMPTORIES I'LL GIVE YOU ALL 
13 FOUR, BUT OTHERWISE, ONLY UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT. 
14 WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO? DO YOU WANT FOUR FOR 
15 A PREEMPTORY? 
16 MR. HARRIS: THREE PLUS ONE? I THINK SO. 
17 YOUR HONOR, WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE — I 
18 DON'T KNOW IF YOU LOOKED AT THAT CASE WE QUOTED ABOUT HOW 
19 THERE'S GOT TO BE A DISPARATE INTEREST SITUATION IN 
20 THERE — AND I CLEARLY WILL NOT DISPUTE PLEASANT GROVE 
21 CITY HAS DISPARATE INTERESTS, BUT I'M A LITTLE INTERESTED 
22 IN HOW SMITH AND STONE HAVE DISPARATE INTERESTS. AND MR. 
23 JEFFS' RESPONSE WAS JUST THEY — NO RESPONSE. SOMEWHERE 
24 ALONG THE LINES IF THERE'S GOING TO BE GROUNDS FOR HAVING 
25 EQUAL PREEMPTORIES EACH, I AT LEAST OUGHT TO HAVE THE 
7 
1 OPPORTUNITY OF KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT IT IS THAT MAKES THEM 
2 SO DISPARATE IN THEIR CLAIMS WHEN MR. MOODY GETS TO HAVE 
3 THREE AND MR. JEFFS GETS TO HAVE THREE, WHEN IN MANY 
4 RESPECTS IT IS CLOSE TO THAT CASE. IT JUST SEEMS TO ME, 
5 FOR THE RECORD, SO I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT, WE NEED TO 
6 ARGUE THAT OR DEAL WITH IT SO WE CAN ADVANCE OUR ARGUMENT 
7 NOW. 
8 THE COURT: COUNSEL, I FEEL THAT THEY ARE 
9 DISPARATE ENOUGH, JUST BY THE NATURE OF THE CASE, TO 
10 PERMIT IT. I DON'T THINK WE NEED THAT. 
11 THE MOTION OF PLEASANT GROVE CITY TO PROHIBIT 
12 ANY MENTION OF INSURANCE IS GRANTED, AND THE PARTIES 
13 SHOULD BE CAUTIONED NOT TO TALK ABOUT INSURANCE AS AN 
14 ISSUE. 
15 (FURTHER MOTIONS DEALT WITH) 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 I, CREED H. BARKER, CSR, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING 
PAGE TO BE A TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID 
21 PROCEEDING, TAKEN DOWN IN SHORTHAND UPON SAID DATE, AND 
REDUCED TO WRITING THIS 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER, 1993. 
22 
23 
S^ CREE^ H .^J^KER, CSR 
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Exhibit 2: Proposed Instructions Relating 
to Right-of-Way 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 ? 
You are instructed that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(2) 
provides: when more than one vehicle enters or approaches an 
intersection from different highways at approximately the same time at 
the intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic control device; 
(b) is not regulated because the traffic control device is 
inoperative; or 
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs, 
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way 
to the vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer. 
If you find, after a preponderance of the evidence, that William 
Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle in violation of the foregoing 
statute, such conduct creates a presumption of negligence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J P 
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at 
the same time and a^ ^^ rcfrst^ antia 1Iy t ho^ jg^ »e- distance from it, 
the driver approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it 
is the duty of the driver approaching on the left to yield the 
right-of-way-
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-
of-way. However, a driver may not speed up to enter an 
intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by 
entering the intersection slightly ahead of another driver. In 
order for a driver approaching from the left to take the right-
of-way, that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of 
the driver approaching from the right. 
muji 5.10 G 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at approximately the same time and 
distance from it, the driver approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it is the duty 
of the driver approaching on the left to yield the right-of-way. 
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-of-way. However, a driver may not 
speed up to enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by entering the 
intersection slightly ahead of another driver. In order for a driver approaching from the left 
to take the right-of-way, that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of the driver 
approaching from the right. 
INSTRUCTION NO. jO 
You are instructed that the Utah Code § 41-6-72(1) provides: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection 
not regulated by an official traffic-control device shall yield 
the right-of-way to any vehicle that has entered the 
intersection from a different highway. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 55* 
You are instructed that the UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(1) provides: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an 
intersection not regulated by an official traffic-
control device shall yield the right-of-way to any 
vehicle that has entered the intersection from a 
different highway. 
Your are instructed that the UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(2) provides: 
(2) When more than one vehicle enters or 
approaches an intersection from different highways 
at approximately the same time and the intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official 
traffic control device; 
(b) is not regulated because the traffic 
control device is inoperative; or 
(c) is regulated from all directions by 
stop signs, 
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the 
vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer. 
References: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(1) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(2) 
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